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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OBSCENITY NOT
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Roth conducted a business in New York in the publication and sale of
books, photographs and magazines. He used circulars and advertising
matter to solicit sales. He was convicted on four counts of a twenty-six
count indictment charging him with mailing obscene circulars and ad-
vertising, and an obscene book, in violation of the federal obscenity
statute.'
Alberts conducted a mail order business. He was convicted on a com-
plaint charging him with lewdly keeping for sale obscene and indecent
books, and with writing, composing and publishing an obscene advertise-
ment of them, in violation of the California Penal Code. 2 The Supreme
Court of the United States held that obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press. Roth v. United States and
Albert v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Prior to the instant cases there was dictum but no square holding by
the Supreme Court that obscenity is not protected by the First Amend-
ment.8
In the instant case the majority opinion of the Supreme Court stated
that "the dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance within the
area of protected speech and press"4 and held "that obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."
The main constitutional issue6 in Roth was whether the statute violates
the provision of the First Amendment that "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." The primary
constitutional question propounded in the Alberts case was whether the
1 18 U.S.C.A. S 1461 (1950).
2 Cal. Penal Code Ann. (West, 1955) § 311.
3 E.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571, 572 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
4 Roth v. United States and Albert v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
5 Ibid., at 485.
6 Aside from the primary constitutional questions, objection to the statutes as being
too vague to support conviction for crime, and, in Roth, whether the ower to punish
speech and press offensive to decency and morality is in the states atone so that the
federal statute violates the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and, in Alberts, whether by
enacting the federal obscenity statute under the power delegated by Article I to estab-
lish post offices and post roads the federal government had preempted the regulation of
the subject matter, were raised and disposed of.
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obscenity provisions of the California Penal Code invade the freedoms
of speech and press as they are incorporated into the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court delivered its opinion based on the premise that there was
no issue presented in either case concerning whether or not the material
involved was obscene. Therefore, as far as their definition of the term
which they held to be unprotected by the Constitution, the Court con-
sidered the matter as divorced from the fact situations involved. They
stated that "all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance
-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing
climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties, unless ex-
cludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests. 7 Obscenity has been held to be utterly without redeeming social
importance.8 The Court defined obscene material to be "material which
deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.9 This, of course,
means the material, taken as a whole, is appealing to prurient interest.' 0
Further, the decision states that in view of the holding that obscenities
are not protected speech, it need not be shown that the material will
create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct or will probably
induce its recipients to such conduct. As stated by Mr. Justice Douglas
in the dissenting opinion of the instant case, "By these standards punish-
ment is inflicted for thoughts provoked, not for overt acts nor antisocial
conduct."" This, the dissent goes on to state, drastically curtails the First
Amendment. As to the greater harm of impinging upon our rights of
freedom of speech and of the press, the following is pertinent:
7 Authority cited note 4 supra at 484. As to the limitations on liberty of the press
which have been recognized in prior decisions, see authority cited note 10 infra.
8 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
9 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). For definition of "prurient" the Court cites Webster's
New International Dictionary, (2d ed., 1949). Also: Model Penal Code, § 207.10(2)
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
10 The old rule of Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360, allowed material to be judged
by the effect of an isolated excerpt on a particularly susceptible person. In United States
v. Kennerly, 209 F.119, 120, 121 (S.D. N.Y., 1913), Justice L. Hand expressed his doubt
as to this standard by stating: "I question whether in the end men will regard that as
obscene which is honestly relevant to the adequate expression of innocent ideas, and
whether they will not believe that truth and beauty are too precious to society at large
to be mutilated in the interests of those most likely to pervert them to base uses." In
United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (C.A. 2d, 1930), 76 A.L.R. 1092 and United States
v. One Book called "Ulysses," 5 F.Supp. 182 (S.D. N.Y., 1933), aff'd 72 F.2d 705 (C.A.
2d, 1934), among others, the doctrine of Regina v. Hicklin was overruled and today
the standard appears to be whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest. Refer to Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
11 Roth v. United States and Albert v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 509 (1957).
CASE NOTES 113
The danger of influencing a change in the current of moral standards of the
community, or of shocking or offending readers, or of stimulating sex thoughts
or desires apart from objective conduct, can never justify the losses to society
that result from interference with literary freedom.12
By testing the legality of a publication either by the purity of thought
which it instills in the mind of the reader or by the degree to which it
offends the community conscience, "the role of the censor is exalted and
society's values in literary freedom are sacrificed."' 13
Thus, while the Court maintained in its decision that it is vital that the
standards for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of
speech and press, i.e., the definition of the class of unprotected words
should be such that informational and educational publications, etc., should
not be without protection, nevertheless, couched in its broad language,
the decision in the Roth and Alberts cases may lead to indiscriminate
censorship, since all a publication need do is incite a lascivious thought or
arouse a lustful desire. Again quoting from the dissent, "the test that
suppresses a cheap tract today can suppress a literary gem tomorrow."'14
A concept as broad as this one, the doctrine of which seemingly pun-
ishes the provoking of thought, closes a door on one facet of our freedoms
which we so jealously guard. Once closed, it is likely to remain so, for
now the doctrine is law, and, as stated by Moore in his poem "Growth
of Law":
I own, of our protestant laws I am jealous
And long as God spares me will always maintain,
That once having taken men's rights or umbrellas,
We ne'er should consent to restore them again.15
As to whether or not the state courts will lean toward the full implica-
tion of the decision in these two cases yet remains to be seen. The Roth
and Alberts cases were cited in the case of Excelsior Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the University of the State of New York' 6 for the proposition
that censorship of true obscenity is valid and essential. The majority of
the court went on to hold that there was no legal basis for not allowing
a license to show the motion picture "Garden of Eden" which is a fiction-
alized depiction of the activities of the members of a nudist group in a
secluded private camp in Florida. This decision, however, was clouded
12 Ibid., at 510. For a discussion of the case refer to Lockhart & McClure, Literature,
The Law of Obscenity, And The Constitution, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295, 387 (1954).
13 Roth v. United States and Albert v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 513 (1957).
14 Ibid., at 514.
15 Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harvard L. Rev. 40, 47 (1938).
163 N.Y.S. 2d 237, 144 N.E. 2d 31 (1957).
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with other issues, i.e., the statute controlling licensing of the exhibiting
of motion pictures, 17 and a criminal statute.' 8 In any event, the court held
that "nudity in itself and without lewdness or dirtiness is not obscenity in
law or in common sense"' 9 and appears not to adhere to the possible ex-
tension of obscenity to that which provokes lustful or lascivious thoughts,
as it quotes the following from the decision rendered in People v. Muller:
If the test of obscenity or indecency in a picture or statue is its capability of
suggesting impure thoughts, then indeed all such representations might be con-
sidered as indecent or obscene. 20
That the decisions of the Supreme Court in Roth and Alberts have
crystallized some of the concepts and removed many of the ambiguities
existing in the treatment of obscene publications is evident. To what
degree they have set the stage for indiscriminate and arbitrary censorship
remains to be seen.
17 N.Y. Education Law (McKinney, 1953) c. 16, §§ 122 and 124 give the Regents the
duty of licensing motion pictures unless the, film or a part thereof is "obscene, indecent,
immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend
to corrupt morals or incite to crime."
18 Ibid., at c. 39, § 1140(b), making any person guilty of a misdemeanor "... who in
any place wilfully exposes his private parts in the presence of two or more persons of
the opposite sex whose private parts are similarly exposed. . . ." This statute mentions
neither movies nor nudism.
19 Authority cited note 16 supra at 241 and 34.
20 96 N.Y. 408, 411 (1884).
CONTRACTS-IMPOSSIBILITY EXISTING AT THE TIME
OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT NO DEFENSE
On February 19, 1942, Dr. Zellmer was sued for divorce. The decree
stipulated that Dr. Zellmer pay the premiums on several life insurance
policies, and make his children, one of whom was the plaintiff, benefi-
ciaries of the policies. At the time of the promise the policies had been
lapsed for non-payment of premiums for eleven years and therefore per-
formance of the promise was impossible when made. Dr. Zellmer died and
the policy was uncollectible. The named insured filed the present claim
against Dr. Zellmer's estate for breach of contract. The estate's defense of
existing impossibility was overruled and the claim was allowed for the
amount of the policy. In re Estate of Zellmer, 1 Wis. 2d 46, 82 N.W. 2d
891 (1957).
Although this precise point of law has seldom been encountered in the
courts of this country, the Zellmer case illustrates a fundamental point
in impossibility law. The governing principle of law is stated in the Re-
